Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys by Leong, Nancy
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2007
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A
Survey of Government Attorneys
Nancy Leong
Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation




Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public Sector: A 
Survey of Government Attorneys 
NANCY LEONG* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT A ITORNEY -CLIENT 
PRNILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 
A. EARLY HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 
B. THE MODEL EVIDENCE CODES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
Ill. THE PRNILEGE IN THE PRN ATE SECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 
B. IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
l. REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 
2. REPRESENTATION OF CORPORATIONS . . • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . 179 
IV. THE PRNILEGE IN THE PuBLIC SECTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 
A. A CLIMATE OF OPENNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 
B. INSTRUMENTAL CONCERNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Kermit V. Lipez of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; J.D., 2006, 
Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Professors George Fisher, David Luban, Deborah Rhode, and Norman 
Spaulding for guiding my research and providing feedback at all stages of the editing process, to Justin Pidot 
and Darien Shanske for their helpful comments, and to all the government attorneys who shared their time and 
thoughts with me. 
163 
164 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 20: 163 
1. CANDOR. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 187 
2. QUALITY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 
C. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY . . . 195 
V. CONCLUSION....................................... 198 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although the attorney-client privilege has a long history in American and 
common law, the issue of whether the privilege extends to government entities 
and the attorneys who represent them remains controversial. In 2005, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the privilege applies to attorney-client relationships in the 
public sector, 1 a holding that directly conflicts with recent decisions in the 
Seventh,2 Eighth,3 and D.C. Circuits.4 These decisions have created uncertainty 
for practitioners who represent government clients and have prompted consider-
able concern from professional organizations. In a recent ABA teleconference, 
moderator Ross H. Garber called attorney-client privilege "one of, if not the most 
important issue for government lawyers."5 
The traditional justification for the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the 
confidentiality guaranteed by the privilege is necessary to promote candor in 
discussions between attorneys and their clients. Many commentators have 
accepted this rationale unquestioningly. However, available empirical evidence is 
equivocal at best. While I draw no firm conclusions about the validity of the 
instrumental rationale generally, I do suggest that the rationale is less persuasive 
for entity clients such as corporations. Moreover, for government entity clients, 
any attempt to justify the privilege instrumentally must account for the 
diminished expectation of confidentiality in the public sector as well as 
democratic values disfavoring secrecy in government. 
In this Note, I aim to demonstrate that the traditional instrumental rationale 
cannot validate an absolute privilege with respect to government entity clients. 
Although my analysis of the privilege in the government context will draw from 
historical precedent and existing scholarly literature, I also hope to provide 
further insight into the way the privilege functions in practice by grounding the 
discussion in a series of twenty-five interviews with government attorneys that I 
I. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
2. In reA Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F. 3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). 
4. In re Bruce Lindsey, !58 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
5. See, e.g., Am. B. Ass'n, Ctr. For Continuing Legal Educ. Teleconf., Everyday Ethics for Government 
Attorneys (Dec. 16, 2005) (recording on file with author). 
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conducted between November 2005 and January 2006.6 
The Note will proceed in three parts. Part I provides the history of the 
government attorney-client privilege, exploring its treatment in the model 
evidentiary codes as well as the increasing attention it has received in the courts. 
Part II explores the theoretical justification for the privilege in more depth and 
examines the few attempts at empirical verification. Although conventional 
wisdom holds that an absolute privilege is necessary to induce client candor, this 
instrumental rationale is particularly dubious when the client is an entity rather 
than an individual. 
Part III turns to the privilege in the government entity context. Because 
individual government officers exercise less control over the privilege than do 
private individual clients, such officers have very different incentives for 
disclosure in communications with attorneys. Moreover, the background regime 
of open government provisions and the high degree of public scrutiny that most 
governments receive foster a climate of openness that contrasts to the baseline 
expectation of confidentiality prevalent in the private sector. Therefore, in many 
cases, the privilege currently provides less assurance of secrecy in the public 
sector. Nonetheless, when interviewed, most government attorneys stated that 
their clients were not preoccupied with the possibility that attorney-client 
communication might become public. Moreover, attorneys expressed that any 
undetected marginal decrease in candor caused by the uncertainty of the privilege 
did not prevent them from representing their clients effectively. 
This evidence strongly suggests that an absolute privilege is not a necessity for 
effective communication between government officials and attorneys, thereby 
undermining the traditional instrumental rationale as a justification for the 
privilege in the government context. While some degree of protection for 
sensitive communications is still appropriate, it is also important to take into 
account the government attorney's unique responsibility to serve the public 
interest. I do not attempt to formulate the proper scope of the government 
attorney-client privilege in this Note. However, courts should weigh the 
important considerations of transparency and openness in government in 
adapting the contours of the attorney-client privilege to the unique context of the 
public sector. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRiviLEGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between 
lawyers and those whom they represent. Many attorneys and commentators have 
accepted, as a matter of course, that the attorney-client privilege extends to 
6. See infra note 111 for a detailed discussion of my interview methodology. 
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government entity clients.7 Yet a closer examination of the history of the 
privilege calls this assumption into question. This section traces the development 
of the attorney-client privilege for government clients in the United States, 
ultimately revealing only equivocal support for a conclusion that the privilege 
functions similarly for government entities. 
A. EARLY HISTORY 
Only two courts confronted the government attorney-client privilege prior to 
the 1960s, and both assumed with little analysis that it protected government 
entities. 8 This lack of jurisprudence on the privilege resulted, at least in part, from 
the provisions of the Federal Housekeeping Act, which enabled government 
officials to prohibit government employees from testifying in court. 9 Following 
the Act's amendment in 1958, however, government officers increasingly relied 
on the attorney-client privilege to block the release of sensitive information. 
In 1963, United States v. Anderson upheld the existence of the privilege with 
little analysis, 10 casting its decision in broad terms that encouraged courts in 
several subsequent cases to assume that the privilege applied to communications 
between government attorneys and employees. 11 The lone objection arose in 
United States v. Board ofTrade of Chicago, in which the United States attempted 
to shield from discovery documents prepared for the Commodities Exchange 
Authority by the Department of Agriculture's Office of General Counsel. 12 The 
court dismissed previous decisions as "conclusory, unsupported, and unex-
plained," and asserted that "novel privileges should be grounded upon more 
pertinent and persuasive precedent than this." 13 The court then found that the 
attorney-client relationship in this particular government context was "more akin 
to the functioning of a high-level corporate officer seeking the views of other 
corporate division chiefs than to the traditional lawyer and client relationship." 14 
Nonetheless, the Board of Trade decision failed to instigate more widespread 
skepticism about the government attorney-client privilege. 
7. PAUL R. RICE, I AITORNEY-CLIENT Pluvn.EGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:28 n.82 (2d ed. 1999) ("Most 
courts have assumed, without analysis, that governmental entities can assert the attorney-client privilege."). 
8. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (noting that "the policy of the 
privilege seems to me to provide no ground for the distinction" between public and private clients); Rowley v. 
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243,248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (assuming that "[t]he fact that both attorney and client were 
public officials should make no difference"). 
9. R.S. § 161 (1875) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 822). 
10. United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518 (D. Colo. 1963). 
II. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. Wise. 1972); Detroit Screwmatic Co. 
v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); General Electric Co. v. United States, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 
442 (Ct. CI. Sept. 19, 1972). 
12. United States v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 71 C 2875, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (N.D. lll. Oct. 30, 
1973). 
13. /d. at *8. 
14. /d. at *9-10. 
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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 15 enacted in 1967, also critically 
influenced the development of case law on the government attorney-client 
privilege. When a party tries to assert the privilege during ordinary litigation, 
courts tend to be skeptical because such action "deprives the court of relevant 
evidence and may obstruct a just determination."16 In the context of FOIA 
requests, however, the case is often at an earlier stage and it is less clear whether 
the documents will be of critical importance. 17 Consequently, courts decided in a 
large number of cases that the attorney-client privilege was grounds for refusing a 
FOIA request without the close scrutiny that they might have applied if the issue 
of government attorney-client privilege arose in a different setting. 18 
Thus, until the past decade or so, courts tended to accept the privilege without 
substantial analysis, although some underlying skepticism lingered. As the court 
in Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States noted, "[c]ourts have 
generally accepted that the attorney-client privilege applies in the governmental 
context, while expressing apprehension at its pernicious potential in a govern-
ment top-heavy with lawyers."19 But for the most part, courts alleviated any 
residual anxiety by reference to the two evidentiary model codes. 
B. THE MODEL EVIDENCE CODES 
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were developed in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Proposed Rule 503, which would have codified the attorney-client 
privilege, was drafted in 1969?0 At the time there were only five state and federal 
opinions that, with little analysis, recognized the government attorney-client 
privilege?1 Despite the overall paucity of evidence, the drafters of Proposed Rule 
503 defined the "client" who can assert a privilege as "a person, public officer, or 
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or 
15. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
16. Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77 
IND. L.J. 469, 480 (2002). 
17. See id. at 480-81. 
18. See, e.g., BryanS. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?, 
51 FLA. L. REv. 695, 710 (1999) (noting that many lower courts have cited NLRB v. Sears for the proposition 
that the government is entitled to an attorney-client privilege, despite the fact that the Sears coun did not 
explicitly hold that Exemption 5 to FOIA incorporated the attorney-client privilege). Others have argued that 
FOIA is frequently employed by litigants or potential litigants seeking to gain information without following the 
rules of discovery. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of lnfonnation Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils 
and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 666-67 & n.76 (1984) (describing the 
manipulation of FOIA to gain strategic advantage). This perception may have fostered courts' increased 
willingness to defer to government claims of privilege in the FOIA context, and suggests that perhaps decisions 
made in a FOIA context are distinguishable from the non-FOIA context. 
19. 87 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
20. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 479. 
21. See id. at 479 and n.57. 
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private.'m Similarly, the Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 503 states 
flatly that "[t]he definition of 'client' includes governmental bodies," citing 
existing cases that themselves failed to examine whether the privilege should 
apply to government attorneys.Z3 
Thus, like the courts that had previously considered the issue, the drafters of 
Proposed Rule 503 did not explain their decision to extend the privilege to 
government entities; as Professor Melanie Leslie observes, there is no record of 
debate over the significance of this choice.24 Nonetheless, courts soon began to 
look to Proposed Rule 503 as authority on the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege, and the rule continues to provide justification for the privilege in the 
government context today. 25 
Proposed Rule 503's conclusory justification for applying the attorney-client 
privilege to government entities is particularly surprising given that the drafters 
in the near-contemporaneous revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence reached 
a contradictory result. Uniform Rule 502, which addresses the attorney-client 
privilege, states that public entities may not claim the attorney-client privilege 
unless the "communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or action 
and the court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the 
public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending investigation, 
litigation, or proceeding in the public interest. "26 Although this formulation 
substantially limits the privilege for government entities, the drafters of the 
Uniform Rules also spent only minimal time discussing the rationale underlying 
their construction of the privilege. Couched in general terms, this justification 
relied primarily on the importance of open government.27 
After the two sets of evidentiary rules were finalized, most states adopted the 
Proposed Federal Rules, including Proposed Rule 503, with its application of the 
attorney-client privilege to government entities. However, four states-
Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma-did adopt the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence version, with its substantially restricted version of the government 
attorney-client privilege.Z8 A few states also adopted the Uniform Rules but 
excised the provision restricting the scope of the privilege, essentially making the 
22. FED. R. Evm. 503(a)(l) (Proposed official draft 1969). 
23. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 503. 
24. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 479. 
25. See, e.g., Winton v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 188 F.R.D. 398, 400 (N.D. Okla. 1999) ("Proposed Rule 503 
recognizes an attorney-client privilege for public entities and officers like the Defendants in this case. The Court 
finds Rule 503's statement to be a sound reflection of the common law. Defendants may, therefore, exercise an 
attorney-client privilege."). 
26. UNIF. R. Evm. 502(d)(6). 
27. Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-third Year, Nat' I Conf. ofComrn'rs on Unif. 
St. Laws 57-58 (1974); Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-second Year, Nat' I Conf. of 
Comrn'rs on Unif. St. Laws 74-75 (1973). 
28. See ARK. CooEANN. § 16-41-101 (1987); ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(7); N.D. R. Evm. 502(d)(6); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(6) (West 1993). 
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privilege coextensive with Proposed Federal Rule 503?9 At least on the faces of 
the relevant statutes, different states vary considerably in the way they treat the 
government attorney-client privilege. 
At the federal level, the Proposed Federal Rules relating to privileges, 
including Proposed Rule 503, engendered considerable controversy. 30 Ulti-
mately, Congress instead adopted a single rule, Rule 501, which allows the courts 
to apply privileges using "principles of the common law.'m Despite this 
instruction, the federal courts have accepted the Proposed Federal Rules as 
evidence of common law practices surrounding the privilege, even though the 
Proposed Federal Rules were never enacted.32 Rule 501 also states that federal 
privilege law applies except where state law supplies the rules of decision?3 
Nonetheless, "the Court has sometimes taken note of state privilege laws in 
determining whether to retain them in the federal system.''34 
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The history outlined in the previous sections suggests that conflicting ideas 
about the proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege have existed, 
albeit in obscurity, for several decades. The Watergate scandal could have 
exposed this tension if communications between President Nixon and his legal 
advisors had been put at issue. Instead, Nixon waived both the executive and 
attorney-client privileges, leaving White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt free to 
testify before the grand jury?5 Similarly, Peter Wallison, White House Counsel 
under President Reagan, produced his diary and assisted in other ways with the 
Iran-Contra investigation.36 Once again, the conflict remained a potentiality. 
All this changed when the Office of the Independent Counsel launched a broad 
investigation into the Clinton administration. The Whitewater investigation 
resulted in a multitude of grand jury subpoenas, against which President 
Clinton's legal defense unsuccessfully tried to claim the attorney-client privilege 
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum37 and In re Bruce R. Lindsey?8 
In Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Eighth Circuit decided the issue of "whether an 
29. See IDAHO R. EVID. 502; KY. R. Evm. 503; MISS. R. Evm. 502; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2 to -5 
(1994); TEx. R. EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502. 
30. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 728 (2002). 
31. FED. R. Evm. 501. 
32. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). 
33. See id. at 368. For example, federal privilege law would apply in a federal grand jury investigation of a 
state government official. 
34. /d. at n.8. 
35. SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, WATERGATE REPoRT 88 (1975), cited in In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 
1263, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
36. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1275. 
37. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). 
38. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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entity of the federal government may use the attorney-client privilege to avoid 
complying with a subpoena by a federal grand jury."39 As part of the Whitewater 
investigation, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr issued a grand jury subpoena 
requiring disclosure of "documents created during meetings attended by any 
attorney from the Office of Counsel to then-President Clinton and Hillary 
Rodham Clinton (regardless of whether any other person was present)."40 The 
White House (as the Eighth Circuit defined the party in interest in the case) cited 
the attorney-client privilege as justification for its refusal to produce the 
documents.41 
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the case's criminal context from the civil 
context in which much of the case law on the government privilege had 
developed,42 also noting "the general principle that the government's need for 
confidentiality may be subordinated to the needs of the government's own 
criminal justice processes."43 The court then emphasized the significant public 
interest concerns at stake: 
We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing 
wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a 
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings 
inquiring into the actions of public officials. We also believe that to allow any 
part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against 
the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would 
represent a gross misuse of public assets. 44 
Although the court acknowledged that voiding the privilege in the criminal 
context might create uncertainty that would make the privilege virtually useless, 
it dismissed this objection by explaining, "confidentiality will suffer only in those 
situations that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate. "45 Thus, the court 
held that the privilege did not apply to the instant situation. 
The following year, in 1998, the D.C. Circuit confronted an identical legal 
issue in In re Bruce Lindsey, this time because Deputy White House Counsel 
Bruce Lindsey declined to answer questions before a federal grand jury 
investigating then-President Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky.46 The 
39. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915. 
40. /d. at 913. 
41. /d. at 914. 
42. /d. at 917-18. 
43. /d. at 919. 
44. /d. at 921. 
45. /d. at 921. Various commentators have criticized this response as inadequate, noting that it is impossible 
to tell in advance what situations a federal grand jury might later investigate. See, e.g., Todd A. Ellinwood, "In_ 
the Light of Reason and Experience": The Case for a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS. 
L. REv. 1291, 1321 (2001) ("(T]he mere possibility of a criminal investigation will often be impossible to know 
ex ante."). 
46. In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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D.C. Circuit also held that the privilege did not provide a shield in the federal 
grand jury context. Similar to the Eighth Circuit, the court based much of its 
reasoning on "the public's interest in uncovering illegality among its elected and 
appointed officials ... another protection of the public interest is through having 
transparent and accountable government."47 
The D.C. Circuit also focused on 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), a federal statute requiring 
that "[a]ny information ... received in a department or executive branch of the 
Government relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and 
employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General .... "48 
Although it is unclear whether the Office of the President, and thus the White 
House Counsel, technically falls within the ambit of section 535(b ), the court 
found that the statute "evinces a strong congressional policy that executive 
branch employees must report information" relating to criminal wrongdoing.49 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that this affirmative responsibility, coupled with the 
public interest in disclosure of information, made the privilege inapplicable in the 
federal grand jury context. 
The Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit departed substantially from previous 
case law and other authority in finding that the government's attorney-client 
privilege receded in the context of a federal grand jury investigation. Not 
surprisingly, these two cases attracted considerable attention in scholarly 
literature, and both have drawn a fair amount of criticism, both for their departure 
from precedent and for their purported partisanship. 5° 
47. Id. at 1273. 
48. 28 u.s.c. § 535(b) (2002). 
49. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274, quoting In reSealed Case (Secret Service), 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
50. Prior to Subpoena Duces Tecum and Lindsay, the leading scholarly analysis of the government 
attorney-client privilege was a Note arguing that the privilege should not be extended to government entities 
because it "does not serve the privilege's underlying goals and conflicts with the principle of open government." 
See Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 
(1988). In the aftermath of the Whitewater cases, some commentators have argued that the rationale for the 
attorney-client privilege is equally compelling when the client is a government entity. See Ellinwood, supra note 
45 (also contending that if a government official has committed a clear violation of the law, the government 
attorney should advise the official to seek private counsel); Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 1682 (1999) (arguing that the privilege should apply except for 
conversations related to personal issues, ongoing criminal investigations, or clearly criminal activity); Note, 
Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Government 
Counsel, ll2 HARv. L. REv. 1995 (1999) (arguing that the government attorney-client privilege should apply 
even in the federal grand jury context). Another Article has focused on the issue of who can waive the privilege 
rather than the underlying policy reasons. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's 
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1998) (analogizing the United States government to a 
corporation and concluding that the Independent Counsel should control the decision whether to assert the 
attorney-client privilege). Other commentators have acknowledged that the government context differs from the 
private sector in some respects, and that the privilege should be modified accordingly. See Amanda J. 
Dickmann, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REv. 291 
(1999) (acknowledging that a qualified privilege is appropriate in the face of a criminal investigation while 
advocating in camera inspection to protect "military, diplomatic and sensitive national security secrets"); Leslie, 
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Nonetheless, the idea of an abrogated government attorney-client privilege in 
the context of a federal grand jury subpoena began to gain traction. In In re A 
Witness before the Special Grand Jury, the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning 
of the Eighth and D.C. Circuits in finding that the Chief Legal Counsel to the 
Secretary of State's Office of Illinois could not invoke the privilege against a 
federal grand jury subpoena. 5 1 The Seventh Circuit also cited the importance of 
considering the public interest, explaining, "interpersonal relationships between 
an attorney for the state and a government official acting in an official capacity 
must be subordinated to the public interest in good and open government .... "52 
At least in criminal cases, courts appeared to have reached a consensus that the 
government privilege should yield. 
This illusion of agreement ended with the Second Circuit's decision in In re 
Grand Jury Investigation. 5 3 Similar to the Seventh Circuit decision, In re Grand 
Jury Investigation involved a grand jury subpoena issued to the former Chief 
Legal Counsel to the Office of the Governor of Connecticut. 54 Unlike the Seventh 
Circuit, the Second Circuit found that the privilege was absolute. The decision 
relied partly on a Connecticut statute providing that "[i]n any civil or criminal 
case or proceeding ... all confidential communications shall be privileged and a 
government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an 
authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege 
and allow such disclosure."55 However, the crux of the Second Circuit decision 
was a belief that government officials must be able to rely on the privilege in 
seeking legal advice. The court found that "if anything, the traditional rationale 
for the privilege applies with special force in the government context,"56 also 
noting that "[u]pholding the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation 
with government lawyers is accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispens-
able part of conducting public business."57 Similar to the Seventh, Eight, and 
D.C. Circuits, the Second Circuit found that public interest considerations 
compelled its decision on the government attorney-client privilege. But in stark 
supra note 16, at 469 (arguing that a qualified privilege is sufficient because the privilege will have little impact 
on government employees' decisions to confide in counsel); Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The 
Uncertain State of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 269 (2001) (suggesting a 
balancing test coupled with in camera inspection to determine whether the privilege should hold). Although 
most of the debate has focused on the privilege in the federal government context, a recent Comment also 
specifically addressed the situation of a federal grand jury investigation of state government corruption. See Joel 
D. Whitley, Comment, Protecting State Interests: Recognition of the State Government Attomey·Client 
Privilege, 72 U. Cm. L. REv. 1533 (2005) (arguing that the public policy reasons for rejecting the attorney-client 
privilege for federal government entities do not apply in the state government context). 
51. In reA Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). 
52. ld. at 294. 
53. 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
54. ld. at 528. 
55. ld. at 534, quoting CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 52-146r(b) (2005). 
56. /d. 
57. /d. 
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contrast to the other circuits, the Second Circuit found that the public interest 
justification actually compelled it to uphold the privilege, rather than to abrogate 
it. 
Thus, recent Second, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuit decisions on the 
privilege demonstrate that the extent of the government attorney-client privilege 
is unsettled, and will likely remain so until the issue is argued before the Supreme 
Court. The importance of this privilege is underscored by Executive Order 
13,233, issued by President George W. Bush in 2001.58 Under previous law, 
presidents could only assert the privilege for as long as they held office.59 
Executive Order 13,233 now decrees that presidents can continue to assert the 
privilege even after they leave office.60 Thus, the scope of the privilege has 
gained even greater significance given that it can be wielded unilaterally not only 
by current presidents, but also by former presidents, years or even decades after 
they leave office, to control what information the public may access. 
In less than fifty years, the government attorney-client privilege has evolved 
from an ignored and virtually unused provision to a hotly-debated issue of 
paramount importance to government officers' efforts to shield sensitive informa-
tion from disclosure to the public. Courts and commentators continue to disagree 
on the subject. Thus, because ready answers are unavailable, the remainder of this 
Note will look to the underlying justification for the privilege and determine 
whether it applies to the government context. 
Ill. THE PRiviLEGE IN THE PRlv ATE SECTOR 
Evidentiary authorities generally agree that the most compelling rationale for 
the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the privilege facilitates "full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients," thereby promoting 
"broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice."61 However, some evidence has called this justification into question by 
casting doubt on whether the attorney-client privilege in fact facilitates candor. 
In this section, I first outline the traditional instrumental rationale for the 
privilege, then summarize the inconclusive empirical research on the subject. The 
58. See Exec. Order 13,233, Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 
(Nov. l, 200 l) [hereinafter Presidential Records Act]. 
59. See Ira Berlin, Executive Order Undermines Democracy, 30 OAH NEWSLETI'ER (Org. of Am. Historians, 
Bloomington, IN), May 13, 2002, http://www.oaii.org/pubs/nl/2002may/berlin.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2006). 
60. See Presidential Records Act, supra note 58, § 2(a) ("[T]he former President or the incumbent President 
may assert any constitutionally based privileges"; ''The President's constitutionally based privileges subsume 
privileges for records that reflect: military, diplomatic, or national security secrets (the state secrets privilege); 
communications of the President or his advisors (the presidential communications privilege); legal advice or 
legal work (the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges); and the deliberative processes of the 
President or his advisors (the deliberative process privilege)."). 
61. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
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indeterminacy of this research prevents firm conclusions on the viability of the 
instrumental rationale. Nonetheless, to the extent that the instrumental rationale 
does justify an absolute privilege for individual clients, I suggest that the 
justification is weaker for entity clients such as corporations. 
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Most evidentiary rules focus on the courtroom behavior of witnesses, 
attorneys, judges, and juries, and are designed to ensure that evidence introduced 
in court is reliable and relevant to the matter at hand. 62 In contrast, the rules of 
privilege are concerned with conduct that occurs in society at large. As 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman observed during the Congressional hearings 
on the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, "unlike most evidentiary rules, 
privileges protect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom."63 
These broader social implications of the privilege may explain why privileges 
in general, and the attorney-client privilege in particular, have prompted so much 
debate. Nineteenth century English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham 
sharply criticized the attorney-client privilege, noting sarcastically that if the 
privilege were revoked, "a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite 
so much assistance from his law advisor, in the way of concerting a false defense, 
as he may do at present."64 
Bentham's cynical view was disputed by evidentiary theorist Dean Wigmore, 
who argued in favor of privileges on the grounds that they facilitate the search for 
truth and hence ensure accurate judicial decision.65 Wigmore's theory was that 
certain communications "originate[] in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed"-in other words, but for the speaker's belief that a given statement 
will remain secret, the statement would not be spoken in the first place. 66 Thus, 
Wigmore believed the privilege would not result in a net loss to the information 
available to a trier of fact, because it would shield only statements that would not 
have been made in its absence.67 Relatedly, Wigmore argued that, if a privilege 
applied, it must be "absolute" in character. 68 Because secrecy was a necessary 
precondition to disclosure, if the speaker felt that secrecy was assured only in 
62. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of 
Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 707, 707 (2004). 
63. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 28 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7097. 
64. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 
479 (1827). 
65. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T. McNaughton rev., 
1961). 
66. ld. (emphasis omitted); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption 
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 145, 151 (2004) 
(emphasis omitted). 
67. See WIGMORE, supra note 65, § 2291. 
68. ld. 
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some circumstances, the disclosure still would be chilled. 
Wigmore's treatise became the foremost authority on evidentiary rules, and his 
view remains extremely influential today.69 His conclusion that the privilege is 
necessary to promote candid disclosure from a client to her attorney is deeply 
ingrained in contemporary legal culture, and the view is so dominant that most 
lawyers, let alone laypeople, never pause to question it. 
A few scholars have advanced non-instrumental justifications for the attorney-
client privilege. 70 Professor Charles Fried argues that the privilege is necessary to 
the fundamental value of client autonomy, claiming that it is "immoral for society 
to constrain anyone from discovering what the limits of [the law's] power over 
him are.'m Professor David Louisell grounds his justification for the privilege in 
a concern for privacy, asserting that the inviolability of certain relationships is 
"more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication."72 Expressing a 
similar concern for human relationships, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Goldberg once asserted that privileges such as the attorney-client privilege 
"relate to the fundamental rights of citizens.'m Finally, Professor Charles 
McCormick argues that 
[ o ]ur adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the 
party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the 
relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our 
customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the 
client's confidential disclosures regarding personal business?4 
The primary response to these arguments is that attorney-client relationships do 
not deserve greater protection than the many other relationships in which 
disclosures frequently occur.75 Thus, although these more conceptual theories 
have received some attention, Wigmore's emphasis on promoting candor has 
retained primacy. 
Despite the dominance of the instrumental rationale, our legal culture still 
69. See Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 708-09. 
70. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 484-85. I am indebted to Melanie Leslie's work for gathering the sources in 
this paragraph. 
71. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573,586 (1977). 
72. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 
TuL. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956). 
73. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before Special Subcomm on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 143-44 (1973) (testimony of Justice Arthur J. Goldberg). 
74. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 87, at 205-206 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3rd 
ed. 1984). 
75. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 16, at 484 & n. 84. Moreover, to the extent that these non-instrumental 
justifications have some relevance for an individual client, they are less persuasive for organizational clients 
such as corporations or governments. For example, Fried's autonomy argument and Louisell's concern for 
privacy and liberty carry far more weight when the rights of an individual human are at stake; it is more difficult 
to argue that a corporation's interest in "liberty" justifies an absolute protection of its officers' communications 
with counsel. 
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reflects a latent discomfort with the privilege. As the Court acknowledged in 
United States v. Nixon, "[privileges] are designed to protect weighty and 
legitimate competing interests ... [and] are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. "76 This account of the 
privilege lies in tension with the instrumental rationale: if Wigmore is right that 
the privilege only protects communications that would not have been made in its 
absence, then application of the privilege would not really represent any such 
derogation. 
In light of this underlying discomfort, it is important to remember that some of 
the assumptions underlying Wigmore's theory about privilege have never been 
empirically verified. Most importantly, it has never been established that the 
privilege is actually necessary to facilitate client candor. The following section 
will explore this assumption in more detail in relation to particular types of 
attorney-client relationships. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE 
The strength of the instrumental rationale for the attorney-client privilege 
varies depending on the identity of the client. This section will suggest that the 
theoretical argument that the privilege facilitates candor is strongest when the 
client is an individual, and is less compelling when the client is an entity such as a 
corporation. Available empirical evidence relating to the instrumental rationale 
does not support any firm conclusions: only a few studies have been conducted, 
and even the most well-designed research construct can only imperfectly 
simulate the calculus that takes place when an actual client weighs whether to 
disclose information to her attorney. Still, for both individual and entity clients, 
available research suggests that the relationship between confidentiality and 
candor is less definitive than popularly assumed. Although only further research 
can resolve this question, both theoretical arguments and available empirical 
evidence suggest that some skepticism with regard to the instrumental rationale is 
warranted, particularly in the context of entity clients. 
1. REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
In 1962, Yale Law School published the results of a study in which 108 
laypersons and 125lawyers filled out questionnaires regarding the importance of 
confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship.77 The study found that many 
subjects believed that an attorney would have to divulge confidential information 
in some situations, suggesting that for these people absolute confidentiality was 
76. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709-10 (1974). 
77. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the 
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962). 
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not a prereqmstte for candid communication. Thirty percent of layperson 
participants (32 of 108) erroneously believed that attorneys have a legal 
obligation to reveal client confidences if asked to do so by a lawyer in court, and 
nearly 20% (21 of 108) stated that they did not know for sure?8 In general, 
laypersons were somewhat more divided on the effect of the privilege than were 
attorneys. While 72% of attorneys (90 of 125) believed that the privilege helped 
induce disclosure, about half of laypersons said they would be "less likely to 
make free and complete disclosure" without the privilege.79 Finally, only 45% of 
laypersons (49 of 108) affirmatively believed that attorneys should not reveal 
confidential information if asked to do so in court. 80 
The Yale study permits only tentative conclusions. It was conducted by a legal 
periodical over forty years ago, and it is difficult to evaluate some of the data 
because lawyers and laypersons were asked different sets of questions. Neverthe-
less, certain results do suggest that an absolute privilege is not necessary to 
induce candor. As Fred Zacharias has explained, its findings imply that, "while a 
preference for nondisclosure rules exists, a substantial majority of laypersons 
would continue to use lawyers even if secrecy were limited."81 
Zacharias attempted to replicate the Yale study in the late 1980s, finding that 
the relationship between the guarantee of confidentiality and the client's 
willingness to disclose was less symmetrical and more complex than Wigmore 
assumed. 82 Although nearly 30% of subjects who had previously consulted 
lawyers on various matters stated that they had shared information that they 
would have been unwilling to disclose without a guarantee of confidentiality, 83 as 
Zacharias observes, there are a number of possible explanations for this result. 84 
Rather than relying on the promise of confidentiality per se, the clients may have 
viewed confidentiality as important "because they view lawyers as honorable 
professionals who customarily promise discretion .... "85 In other words, 
participants may have viewed the guarantee of confidentiality as an indicator of a 
78. !d. at 1261 (FormA- Laymen- Question 5). 
79. /d. at 1232 n.38, 1262, 1270 (Form A- Laymen- Question 6; Form C- Lawyers- Question 5). The 
conclusions that can be drawn here are limited because the question did not measure the extent of the privilege's 
effect on disclosure. For example, we have no way of knowing whether the attorneys believed that the privilege 
had a significant impact on disclosure or only a small impact, or whether laypersons would be significantly less 
likely to make free and complete disclosure, or only slightly less likely. 
80. !d. at 1262 (Form A- Laymen- Question 7). 
81. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 378 (1989). 
82. See id. 
83. /d. at 381. Half of all subjects (including those who had consulted lawyers previously as well as those 
who had not) predicted that they would withhold information from attorneys if no firm obligation of 
confidentiality existed. /d. at 380. 
84. !d. at 380. 
85. !d. at 381. This hypothesis is bolstered by a question that asked clients whether they would withhold 
information if the lawyer "promised confidentiality except for specific types of information which he/she 
described in advance": only 15.1% of clients stated that they would withhold information in such a situation. /d. 
at 386. 
178 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 20: 163 
lawyer's competence rather than as a promise of absolute secrecy. 
Other parts of the survey lend weight to Zacharias' inference. One suggestive 
portion asked subjects whether lawyers should disclose privileged information in 
morally compelling situations where the current privilege rules nonetheless 
clearly forbid disclosure.86 In nearly all cases, a substantial majority of subjects 
concluded that a lawyer should disclose the privileged information.87 Moreover, 
the fact that lawyers could disclose information in certain situations did not 
appear to impact subjects' willingness to consult with attorneys: in each of twelve 
hypotheticals, less than 25% of subjects indicated that they would be less willing 
to consult a lawyer if such disclosure was allowed. 88 Thus, the Zacharias study 
also suggests that absolute confidentiality may not be necessary for individual 
clients to be willing to communicate candidly with their lawyers. 
Commentators have raised other questions about the need for confidentiality. 
One theorizes that laypersons generally "engage in a balancing process" in 
deciding whether to share information, weighing the "rewards, benefits, or utility 
of disclosure."89 Yet this does not necessarily support the need for the privilege, 
because we cannot "assume[ ] that the layperson is acting rationally at the time of 
the decision whether to disclose."9° For example, the client may be overly 
influenced by his own emotional reactions, or may have a "diverse variety of 
conflicting, contradictory goals" that militate in opposite directions with respect 
to disclosure.91 Another commentator has argued that the privilege provides a 
critical incentive for many criminal defendants, who are likely to be unfamiliar 
with the applicable law and who may withhold facts important to their defense 
unless confidentiality is assured, but that in other circumstances the privilege is 
far less compelling.92 Finally, several researchers have reported significant 
variations in self-disclosure patterns among individuals93-thus, even if some 
people do require the privilege to reveal information, it may not be a necessary 
precondition for the majority.94 
The available data simply do not provide a clear answer to the question of 
86 Typical scenarios involved privileged information regarding the whereabouts of a kidnapping victim or 
the innocence of a person falsely accused of a crime./d. at 409. 
87. /d. at 395. 
88. ld. 
89. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 718. 
90. /d. at 719. 
91. /d. at 719-20. 
92. Leslie, supra note 16, at 483. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination absolves 
the client-defendant of the obligation to "reveal compromising facts to his adversary." /d. In contrast, the 
discovery rules in civil litigation require disclosure of every relevant fact, so even information that the client 
would rather keep secret is often bound to come out during discovery. 
93. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 720-21. 
94. Of course, even if a small but significant minority of people requires an absolute privilege for disclosure, 
this might provide sufficient justification for such a privilege. Certainly this argument holds some sway in the 
individual context, but in the government context, we must balance these considerations against the competing 
values of transparency and openness that will be discussed more thoroughly in Part ill. 
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whether the attorney-client privilege is a requirement for candid communication 
between individual clients and their lawyers. Yet existing research does suggest 
that the necessity of confidentiality is an open question even for these clients, for 
whom the instrumental rationale is at its most robust. The next section will 
discuss the even stronger cause for skepticism about the instrumental justification 
in the corporate context. 
2. REPRESENTATION OF CORPORATIONS 
Courts have consistently held that the attorney-client privilege applies in 
situations where the client is a corporate entity.95 The seminal case is Upjohn Co. 
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court not only held that the privilege 
extends to corporations, but also affirmed that the privilege covers communica-
tions between an attorney and any employee representing the corporation, rather 
than merely those involving a "control group" consisting of upper manage-
ment.96 
Following Upjohn, the corporate attorney-client privilege is firmly entrenched 
in legal doctrine. Nonetheless, applying the attorney-client privilege to the 
corporate context adds a new layer of conceptual difficulty.97 People generally 
advance the same instrumental rationale as for individual clients-"to encourage 
more open and candid communication from those who personify the corporation 
in order that attorneys can render more informed advice to the corporation."98 
Importantly, however, the privilege extends only to the corporate entity, not to its 
individual employees.99 
This limitation results in a misalignment of interests. Because individual 
corporate employees are not protected by the privilege, they may lack incentive 
to disclose information regardless of whether the privilege applies to the 
corporation as a whole. Corporate counsel is likely to share information reported 
by an individual employee with at least the upper management of the corporation. 
Thus, as Leslie suggests, an employee may hesitate to reveal information that 
looks bad for herself or for the corporation, either because she fears reprisal from 
her employer or because she fears more general damage to her reputation. 100 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915). 
96. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981). 
97. As Paul Rice, aulhor of lhe leading treatise on lhe attorney-client privilege, explains, "lhe very existence 
of lhe [corporate] privilege is based on intuition, instinct, assumption, and hunches about lhe conduct of 
individuals." RICE, supra note 7, § 4:10; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 217-34 (1988) 
(suggesting lhat attorney-client privilege should be abolished when the client is an organization ralher than a 
natural person). 
98. RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21. 
99. /d. at 96. It is also important to keep in mind lhat lhe corporation's attorney-client privilege "does not 
personally protect lhe agents, even lhough lhey may have incurred personal liability from lhe actions on behalf 
of the corporation." /d. at 97, citing United States v. Aramony, 88 F. 3d 1369, 1388-92 (4th Cir. 1996). 
100. Leslie, supra note 16, at 493. 
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This concern is particularly salient because the employee has no personal 
control over the privilege: when the client is a corporate entity, only the board of 
directors has the power to waive or assert the privilege. 101 Should the board 
decide to waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation, the individual 
employee has no means of resisting, even if the information revealed is 
personally damaging. 102 Even for relatively high-ranking employees who do 
exercise some control over the privilege, the possibility that information will be 
shared with other high-ranking employees may create a disincentive to reveal 
information. 103 
The only existing empirical study of the corporate attorney-client privilege, 
conducted in the 1980s, also suggested that the existence of a privilege does not 
determine high-ranking employees' decisions to disclose. 104 In interviews, 
corporate executives did cite the privilege as one factor in their decision to 
confide information, but the most important factor was their trust in the particular 
attorney. 105 If the privilege were tailored to allow disclosure in some situations, 
the survey suggested that there would be little chill on most communications, 
although at the margin it might decrease candor among upper-level executives, 
particularly with respect to written communications. 106 
Professor Paul Rice speculates that economic incentives may nonetheless 
provide justification for the attorney-client privilege. He explains, "Because of 
the privilege's guaranteed protection to the corporation, the corporation's 
hierarchy will be more willing to exercise the economic power over its 
employees and order them to communicate with counsel. The threat of sanction 
will often influence employees to relate facts that are adverse to themselves."107 
Although this seems reasonable in theory, it is more challenging to envision how 
it would play out in practice. To wield the threat of sanction effectively, upper 
management would have to be aware that the recalcitrant employee knew 
something important. Moreover, the sanction the corporation threatened would 
have to be more severe than the consequences the employee feared from 
disclosure. Surely these conditions would occur in only a subset of cases. 
Rice also makes the argument that employees may decide to be candid simply 
because "the interests of both the individual employees and the corporate client 
101. See RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21. 
102. Leslie, supra note 16, at 493. 
103. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 166-73. For example, Thornburg points out that an employee may be 
concerned that other employees will waive the privilege with respect to his communication by disclosing the 
communication to non-privileged individuals. See id. at 166-73. Even if the disclosure remains within the 
company, a high-ranking officer may wish to avoid remonstrations from his colleagues. 
104. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. 
JoHN's L. REv. 191 (1989). The study did not examine the impact of the privilege on rank-and-file employees. 
105. /d. at 277. It is worth noting that trust in an attorney might be fostered by the existence of the privilege. 
106. /d. at 264, 371, 374. 
107. RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21. 
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often coincide" and thus the assertion of the privilege "usually enures to the 
benefit of its employees."108 Certainly this unity of interests can occur, although 
it is less certain whether it affects employees' disclosure calculations, particularly 
at the early stages of an investigation when it is unclear whether their interests 
will be aligned with those of the corporation. 
Notwithstanding Rice's arguments, it is generally uncertain to what extent the 
privilege actually encourages rank-and-file employees to communicate more 
candidly with corporate counsel. For upper-level management, Leslie theorizes 
that the attorney-client privilege may provide some incentive to be more 
forthcoming. 109 Such executives' personal interests are more likely to be aligned 
with those of the corporation, and they may also have more influence over 
whether the corporation as a whole waives the privilege.uo Yet Leslie also 
expresses skepticism as to whether the eventual outcome is desirable: even if the 
privilege "affects the candor of upper management at the margins ... it often 
does so in service of dubious ends,"u 1 perhaps by allowing executives to conceal 
their own wrongdoing from shareholders and the public. 
In sum, the instrumental rationale is less compelling in the corporate context 
than in the individual context. For rank-and-file employees, lack of control over 
the privilege and fear that inculpatory information will be disclosed to their 
supervisors means that the privilege will likely provide little additional incentive 
for frank communication. For upper-level management, on the other hand, the 
attorney-client privilege may facilitate candor in some situations. 
Ultimately, I do not seek to undermine the instrumental rationale in the context 
of the private sector. However, I do wish to question the extent to which we 
accept this rationale for the privilege in all circumstances. The corporate entity 
privilege, in particular, raises problems with the instrumental rationale that 
resonate even more powerfully in the government context. 
IV. THE PRIVILEGE IN THE PuBLIC SECTOR 
This Part will discuss the attorney-client privilege as it applies to government 
entity clients. To contextualize the theoretical conclusions that courts and 
commentators have advanced, I will also present the findings of a series of 
interviews that I conducted with attorneys who represent state and municipal 
governments. u 2 
108. /d. 
109. Leslie, supra note 16, at 494. 
llO. /d. 
Ill. /d. 
ll2. The interviews were conducted during the two-and-a-half months between November 15, 2005, and 
January 31, 2006. The bulk of my interviews were with attorneys who worked for state attorney generals' 
offices. I conducted twenty such interviews with attorneys in twenty different states. I also conducted five 
interviews with attorneys who represented municipalities. To locate government attorneys willing to be 
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Realities of government practice render the instrumental rationale unpersua-
sive in the public sector. Like corporate employees, most government employees 
do not exercise individual control over the privilege. Moreover, government 
employees are subject to open government provisions and extraneous media and 
political pressures that considerably diminish their expectation of confidentiality. 
Despite this background, government attorneys report that their clients communi-
cate with sufficient candor to allow adequate representation. Thus, although 
confidentiality may provide a meaningful incentive for communication in some 
cases, it does not have to take the form of an absolute privilege that guarantees 
total secrecy. 
Because instrumental necessity does not justify an absolute privilege, the 
unique responsibilities of public sector practice can help to determine a more 
appropriate tailoring. The government attorney has a duty to promote the public 
interest, and, as many commentators have recognized, the important democratic 
values of transparency and openness in government bear substantially on this 
interest. I do not attempt the complex task of delineating the privilege in this 
Note. However, in light of the government attorney's unique responsibility to the 
public, courts should weigh the importance of open government heavily as they 
determine the scope of the privilege for government entities. 
A. A CLIMATE OF OPENNESS 
The attorney-client privilege operates against a backdrop of other provisions 
designed to promote openness in government. Every state has FOIA provisions 
interviewed, I either called a general telephone number or sent an email to a general email address for a 
government entity. The attorneys I contacted were exceedingly generous with their time; several discussions 
exceeded an hour in length. 
I acknowledge the limitations of my research. First, the interviews were not standardized: although I 
attempted to cover the same set of issues in each interview, the order and phrasing of my questions varied 
somewhat depending on my interviewee's responses. Thus, the information I gleaned may be used for only the 
broadest of quantitative comparisons; any more specific analysis is likely to be deceptive. My sample of 
attorneys was also non-representative. Although I attempted a degree of randomization by contacting the 
general number or email address for government counsel, the attorneys with whom I eventually spoke cannot be 
described as a random sample. They may have agreed to speak with me due to their specific experience with the 
privilege, their seniority in the office, their familiarity with ethics issues, or simply their lighter workload. 
Finally, there might of course be a discrepancy between what attorneys say about the privilege to an interviewer 
and what they actually do on a daily basis. 
Despite these obvious shortcomings, I felt that the interview methodology I employed was appropriate to a 
nuanced and complex issue such as the attorney-client privilege. Objective questionnaires would have allowed 
greater standardization and more potential for quantitative analysis, but also might have encouraged attorneys to 
craft cautious, lawyerly responses. The interviews also frequently yielded interesting information that a 
questionnaire would not have uncovered because I would not have asked about it. 
To facilitate discussion I assured all attorneys that information they shared with me would be kept 
confidential, and that they would not be identified by state, agency, or name. The source for each quotation in the 
Note has been anonymized, and all identifying information has been redacted. Several attorneys requested 
copies of my written product for their records, which I provided upon completion. 
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and other public records acts, which are designed to allow public access to 
virtually all government documents that do not fall within a recognized 
exception. Many jurisdictions also have some version of an open meetings act, 
which allows public attendance at any meeting between government officers 
unless a recognized exception applies. Paul Rice has observed that the extent of 
open government laws in seven states abolishes the government attorney-client 
privilege altogether; 113 other states provide only a limited exception for 
attorney-client communications concerning pending claims or litigation. 114 
Moreover, Rice notes, "there have so far been no reported adverse consequences 
from this action." 115 These open government provisions have shaped the 
expectations of the government employees they regulate. As one state attorney I 
interviewed explained, "people in state government are used to operating under 
public scrutiny and being very candid."116 
As discussed in Part I.B, a few states also have adopted the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, with its provision that the attorney-client privilege does not apply 
unless the communication is in preparation for litigation or some other 
proceeding. 117 Attorneys I spoke to from these states differed in their assessment 
of how this evidentiary provision played out in practice: one stated that "for all 
practical purposes, we treat it as though there is no privilege," 118 while another 
hesitated before commenting, "I think most people don't actually know about the 
exception. It hasn't come up." 119 Still, at least in those states where attorneys are 
aware of the limitations on the privilege, it seems there is little expectation of 
confidentiality. 
Uncertainty as to who controls the privilege also reduces the expectation of 
confidentiality. Ordinarily only the client can waive the privilege, 120 but in the 
government context, the client might be viewed as the individual officer, the 
agency, the executive branch, the government as a whole, or even the citizens of 
the state or municipality. 121 In some cases, the identity of the client may vary 
depending on the structure of the government entity and the nature of the matter 
113. See Paul R. Rice, The Government's Attorney-Client Privilege: Should It Have One?, PuB. CoUNs. 
NEWSLETTER, (Md. St. B. Ass'n, Baltimore, MD), http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/acgov.md.htm. 
114. Leslie, supra note 16, at 504-5. 
115. Rice, supra note 113. 
116. Telephone Interview with State Attorney ("SA") #4 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
117. See supra Part I.B. 
118. Telephone Interview with SA #1 (Nov. 22, 2005). 
119. Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
120. FED. R. EVID. 503(b) (Proposed official draft 1969). 
121. See Paulsen, supra note 50, at 487-92 (analyzing this question in the federal context and concluding that 
the "client" of an attorney working in the White House Counsel's office is the government as a whole); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt.9 (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("Although in some 
circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive 
branch, or the government as a whole."). 
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at hand. 122 Many attorneys I interviewed agreed that the client's identity is fluid; 
one state attorney recalled "a time when I spent an hour and a half speaking with 
our antitrust attorneys to figure out who the client was." 123 
Although such difficult questions of client identity do arise, the default 
presumption is that the agency is the client. As the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers states, "For many purposes, the preferable approach ... 
is to regard the respective agencies as the clients and to regard the lawyers 
working for the agencies as subject to the direction of those officers authorized to 
act in the matter involved in the representation." 124 In practice, most state 
attorneys adopted this presumption, agreeing that the agency was the client for 
the majority of the matters they handled, while municipal attorneys viewed the 
city council as their client. 
The fact that the client is usually an entity creates some of the same difficulties 
as it does in the corporate context: because the agency itself cannot control the 
privilege, it is unclear which employees can act on its behalf to waive or assert the 
privilege. In practice, the agency head seems to control the privilege in most 
states, although again this has not been tested extensively in the courts. A few 
state attorneys also thought that the governor might have input into whether to 
waive or maintain the privilege. 125 Others guessed that the governor could waive 
the privilege over the agency head's objections, but added that this had never 
occurred. 126 At least one state has a "control group" test, in which only one of a 
select few high-ranking agency officers can assert the privilege. 127 In the 
municipal setting, the two attorneys I spoke with agreed that the privilege could 
be waived by a vote of the majority of the city council. 
The important point is that in most cases an individual government employee 
exercises little or no control over the waiver of the privilege. If an agency 
employee discloses sensitive information to a government attorney, the head of 
122. See, e.g., REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000) ("No universal 
definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible .... Those who speak for the governmental client 
may differ from one representation to another. The identity of the client may also vary depending on the purpose 
for which the question of identity is posed."). 
123. Telephone Interview with SA#17 (Jan. 20, 2005). 
124. REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNiNG LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c; see also United States v. AT&T, 
86 F.R.D. 603, 617 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that, while the identity of the government attorney's client is unclear, 
it "clearly includes the attorney's own agency"); Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government 
Lawyer?, in EnncAL STANDARDS IN THE PuBuc SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLiENTS, AND 
PuBuc OFFICiALS 13, 24 (Patricia Salkin ed., 1999) ("[T]he government lawyer is ethically bound to represent 
the agency by whom he or she is employed .... "). 
125. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA# 3 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
126. Telephone Interview with SA#7 (Dec. 5, 2005). But see, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9, 
2005) ("My first reaction is that, although the agency head is appointed by the governor, the advice is to the 
agency, not to the governor."). 
127. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). Interestingly, this test seems very similar to the one 
rejected by the Court in the corporate context in Upjohn. See United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383, 390-92 
(1981). 
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the agency can later waive the privilege over the employee's objection. Relatedly, 
the attorney has an ethical responsibility to tell the head of the agency when an 
employee reveals information of potential legal concern.128 Thus, for most 
employees, there is little certainty of confidentiality even to the extent that the 
privilege exists in their particular jurisdiction. 
The possibility of waiver might provide little disincentive for communication 
if employees felt reasonably sure that their superiors would not waive the 
privilege. Yet this certainty does not seem to exist in practice: many attorneys 
attested to substantial media and political pressures that often prompted waiver of 
the privilege even if a government entity was legally entitled to assert it. As one 
state attorney explained: 
There's nothing in the Open Records Act that was intended to obviate the 
attorney-client privilege. But there are pressures from the media if they are 
running their stories and they want to know something right away. The 
presumption is that something will be released unless it falls within a 
recognized exception. And sometimes, even if something would be privileged, 
a client will release it because there is political pressure. A lot of times the client 
doesn't want to incur the wrath of the public .... quite frankly, after you get 
hammered in the headlines for several days, the attorney-client privilege 
becomes secondary. 129 
Other attorneys agreed that asserting the privilege required a certain expenditure 
of political capital that sometimes was not worth the benefit it yielded. One 
explained, "We usually approach it as practically as possible ... we may advise 
people just to waive it. The state doesn't want to be in the position of hiding the 
ball."t3o 
The realities of government operation provide important context for an 
examination of the government attorney-client privilege. In many localities, 
128. See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b) (explaining that when a lawyer knows that there has been a legal violation 
by a member of an organization, "the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization 
as determined by applicable law"); Leslie, supra note 16, at 506; Barsdate, supra note 50, at 1379. Federal law 
also requires executive branch employees to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney 
General. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2002). 
129. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). The same attorney also mentioned that with the short 
deadline set by the state's Open Records Act, media pressure sometimes even made it difficult to review all 
requested documents prior to release. See Telephone Interview with SA #17 (Jan. 20, 2006) ("I dealt with 
[media pressure] in a situation involving the regulation of charities, where the attorney general is the client 
because there is no separate agency that regulates it. So we went ahead and opened up all the files on a matter, 
and decided not to assert the privilege, although we could have."); Telephone Interview with SA #11 (Dec. 13, 
2005) ("In representing one of our state agencies, you have to be cognizant of the fact that whatever we do, the 
agreement will eventually be public. Whereas in the private sector you're not going to have Joe Public knocking 
on the door."). 
130. Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 
2001) ("We might be encouraging our clients to waive the privilege as a matter of public policy. As a practical 
matter, political pressure might make waiving the privilege the best thing to do."). 
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officials are already accustomed to substantial public scrutiny of their actions as a 
result of various open government provisions. Sometimes such provisions 
effectively moot the privilege altogether. Moreover, even in governments where 
the privilege continues to have teeth, government officers are not guaranteed 
confidentiality. Because a high-ranking official-in most cases, either the agency 
head or the governor--controls the privilege, the individual employee has no 
direct control over its waiver. At the local government level, because the city 
council as a whole decides to waive the privilege by majority vote, an individual 
council member also lacks absolute control over the waiver of the privilege. 
Particularly given that external pressure from the media or other groups may 
make disclosure of privileged information politically prudent even where not 
legally compelled, most officers are not in a position to rely on the privilege to 
shield their communications. 
The highest-ranking officials, such as agency heads, exert more direct control 
over the waiver of privilege. However, open government provisions still apply to 
at least some of their communications. Moreover, media scrutiny is likely to be 
much greater for high-ranking officials, leading to situations where the most 
prudent course of action is to release the communications. Even when an agency 
head wishes to assert the privilege, she may face significant pressure from other 
high-ranking officers to waive the privilege. Moreover, because the privilege 
extends to the office or agency rather than the individual, even if a high-ranking 
official decides to assert the privilege, her successor may later decide to waive the 
privilege and make the communication public. 131 Other provisions, such as the 
deliberative process privilege, may provide greater protection for the communi-
cations of high-ranking officials than for low-to-mid-level government employ-
ees. 132 Still, at least with respect to the attorney-client privilege, even these 
high-ranking officers are not wholly immune to the climate of openness that 
permeates government, and cannot presume that their communications with their 
attorneys will never become public. 
B. INSTRUMENTAL CONCERNS 
The climate of openness present in government provides a backdrop for 
131. See Rosenthal, supra note 124, at 26 ("Should the agency head resign or otherwise terminate service 
and be replaced with a different individual, it is the new agency head that speaks on behalf of the agency and 
thus will be able to assert or waive the privilege."); Leslie, supra note 16, at 518 & n.230. Although this issue 
has never been litigated explicitly in the government context, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of a 
successor in interest to waive the privilege in the context of other entities. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356 (1985) (holding that a corporation's bankruptcy trustees can waive the 
privilege over the objection of the corporation's directors). 
132. For example, some commentary has suggested some doubt as to whether the deliberative process 
privilege extends to lower-level officials. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process 
Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REv. 279, 299 (1989). The deliberative process privilege is discussed in more detail infra 
note 142. 
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questioning the viability of the instrumental rationale in the government context. 
Many commentators have simply assumed that a weak attorney-client privilege 
in the government context would lead to an unacceptable chilling of communica-
tion between government officers and their attorneys. 133 Evidence given to 
support this generalization generally takes the form of stylized hypotheticals or 
citations to other commentators. 134 
However, interviews with attorneys who represent government officers 
suggest that these prevailing assumptions do not necessarily hold true. Although 
attorneys reported that government officers sometimes expressed a general 
concern for confidentiality, the existence of an absolute privilege was not 
determinative in the decision to disclose information. Many attorneys regarded 
the privilege as qualified, nonexistent under applicable laws, or uncertain due to 
other considerations, yet the officers they represented continued to communicate 
with apparent candor. More importantly, attorneys uniformly reported that 
regardless of any undetected chilling effect, they were still able to provide 
adequate representation for their clients. Ultimately, the lack of a serious 
impediment to communication and the continued ability of government attorneys 
to represent their clients indicate that the instrumental concerns provide 
insufficient justification for an absolute government attorney-client privilege. 
1. CANDOR 
As explained above, the attorney-client privilege provides a less-than-absolute 
guarantee of secrecy for government employees. However, it is uncertain 
whether this diminished confidentiality actually reduces government employees' 
willingness to confide in counsel. Conversations with government counsel 
suggest that government employees are aware of the privilege, but it is not their 
central focus. The degree of concern for the privilege varies considerably from 
one government entity to another and from one government employee to the next. 
In some cases, government officers were attentive to the privilege. One 
attorney, who also noted that the media was particularly active in his state, said 
that "not a week goes by that one of my clients doesn't say, hey [name redacted], 
do we have that attorney-client privilege confidentiality thing. So they are acutely 
133. See, e.g., Dickmann, supra note 50, at 307-08 ("'Chilling' effects on full and frank communications will 
inevitably occur."); Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1321, 1325 ("If the sanctity of the privilege is not assured ex 
ante, a chilling effect on client communication will result."; "The fact that there will be a chilling effect is 
evident .... "); Chud, supra note 50, at 1690 ("[T]he client would not necessarily have divulged the information 
to the court absent the protection offered by the attorney-client privilege."); Note, supra note 50, at 2012 
("[O]nly through the preservation of the certainty and scope of the attorney-client privilege, whether in the 
private or governmental context, can society promote the full and frank communication essential to the 
provision of complete and effective legal advice."); Whitley, supra note 50, at 1535-37 ("[T]he attorney-client 
privilege furthers public policy by encouraging client disclosure .... "). 
134. See, e.g., Dickmann, supra note 50, at 307-08; Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1320-21; Whitley, supra 
note 50, at 1537. 
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aware of it, and they ask about it continually."135 Another attorney acknowl-
edged, "Sometimes when I'm talking to a client people will ask if this is 
privileged. Not because they did something illegal or something, but just because 
they want to understand the ground rules."136 
Other attorneys felt that concern about the privilege varied from one client to 
the next. An attorney who represented an agency of several hundred people 
explained, "Some people, they have a red file folder marked privilege, and 
anything from me automatically goes in there. Others, it just gets buried, and they 
are not really aware of it."137 Attorneys also commented that an employee's 
amount of public sector experience sometimes factored into their concern for the 
privilege. One stated, "We don't talk about it a lot .... It's because we have a lot 
of repetitive clients. So they already know how the privilege works. Sometimes 
we get someone who we haven't worked with before, and they will say to me, ifl 
tell you something, is it privileged?"138 Another agreed, "Newer people to 
government tend to ask about it more."139 
Finally, a significant group of attorneys stated that their clients were not 
concerned with the privilege. One explained, "My experience has been, at least 
with the agencies I've dealt with, they don't give a lot of thought to the 
attorney-client privilege. Sometimes I do have an agency head say, 'I'm telling 
you this as an attorney,' even if they may not know exactly what that means."140 
A twenty-year veteran of a state attorney general's office agreed: "In my 
experience, there hasn't been much said about it in normal day-to-day representa-
tion."141 To some extent, the lack of concern for the attorney-client privilege may 
have been due to other confidentiality provisions that exist in some jurisdictions, 
such as the deliberative process privilege. 142 Still, it seems likely that many 
135. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). 
136. Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
137. Telephone Interview with SA#IO (Dec. 9, 2005). 
138. Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
139. Telephone Interview with SA #5 (Dec. 2, 2005). 
140. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
141. Telephone Interview with SA #13 (Dec. 15, 2005). 
142. For a thorough discussion of the deliberative process privilege, see Weaver & Jones, supra note 132. As 
the authors explain, the privilege protects predecisional communications among government officials that make 
recommendations or express opinions on legal or policy matters. /d. at 290, 296. The privilege is qualified, and 
can be overridden on a showing of sufficient need. /d. at 315-20. The privilege is available to federal 
government officials and to state and municipal officials in federal court, and has been recognized by many, 
though not all, state courts. See Kirk D. Jensen, Note, The Reasonable Government Official Test: A Proposal for 
the Treatment of Factuallnfomwtion Under the Federal Deliberative Process Privilege, 49 DuKE L.J. 561, 
561-65 & n.14 ( 1999) (collecting cases and other authority). 
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the deliberative process privilege has been justified on grounds of 
instrumental necessity. See, e.g., Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the 
Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769, 1800-01 (2005) ("[T]he basic assumption that people 
speak more freely in private than in public is so deeply rooted in our law that it would be odd if such an insight 
were not recognized in the context of government deliberations as it is in so many other contexts."); Weaver & 
Jones, supra note 132, at 316 ("One would also expect some administrators to be more cautious in their future 
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government clients simply are not overly preoccupied about whether the 
privilege is available to protect their disclosures. 
Regardless of whether their clients expressed concerns about confidentiality, 
most attorneys felt that these concerns did not significantly constrain communica-
tions with their clients. An attorney from a state with broad open government 
laws commented, "There's really not much of a chilling effect. People just kind of 
do their job and don't think about things becoming public record." 143 The 
observation suggests that in many cases the fact that government employees need 
legal advice to "do their job" is sufficient incentive to communicate with lawyers, 
regardless of the contours of the privilege. 144 Another attorney, whose state 
supreme court had held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in 
litigation between agencies, nonetheless felt that the decision had not made 
clients significantly less forthcoming: "In general I think it doesn't make a 
difference. It's kind of like putting TV cameras around. For a while people 
modify their behavior, but then they forget and go back to what they were doing 
before."145 An attorney who worked in a state where the governor had recently 
released an agency memo without seeking permission from the agency nonethe-
less believed that the incident would not chill communications: "This won't 
really affect things. Maybe on the margin people will be a little less willing to 
talk, but for the most part, no." 146 On the whole, attorneys stated that their clients 
were sufficiently candid with them, and felt that concerns about the privilege did 
not conflict with the desire to obtain accurate legal advice through frank 
disclosure. 
If anything, attorneys felt that their clients become concerned about the 
privilege after disclosing something, rather then tempering their candor pre-
disclosure. One state government attorney commented, 
I have not ever had someone say to me, I didn't come to you because I thought 
someone might get this information later. So I haven't found that our open 
government has created obstacles to agencies getting legal advice .... I think 
most don't think about it until after the fact, and they say, wow, I wish I hadn't 
said that. 147 
Another attorney explained that "in many cases, people want the attorney-client 
privilege because they just don't want to deal with the consequences. That's just 
deliberations [if there were no privilege]."). However, commentators have also aired misgivings about the 
viability of the instrumental rationale for the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., Gerald Wetlaufer, 
Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 886-88 (1990) 
(questioning whether the absence of the privilege would in fact chill communication). 
143. Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005). 
144. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 498-99. 
145. Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
146. Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
147. Telephone Interview with SA#10 (Dec. 9, 2005). 
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practical."148 The concern that a previous statement will become public, 
however, does not provide as compelling a justification for the privilege as the 
concern that the statement will not be made in the first place, because no chilling 
of communication has taken place. 
Some attorneys even remarked that they wished their clients were less 
forthcoming with information, particularly in the context of electronic communi-
cations. One state attorney explained regretfully, 
Things are forwarded so easily. I've sent something on email responding to an 
email from an agency employee, and they forward it to all the managers, and 
then those people forward it to someone. So I don't know how many people it 
went out to- it could be in the hands of a hundred people! People think, 'it's 
just email.' 149 
Another added, "Every once in a while I have to send out a reminder saying, 
'please remember to mark this privileged if it's from me.' Another thing is with 
email, sometimes people will send me a message and cc, like, seven or eight 
people."150 In such cases, attorneys felt that their clients were not thoughtful 
about confidentiality and wished that they would be more circumspect about their 
disclosures. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that attorneys unanimously agreed that their 
clients were willing to be candid regardless of the privilege. One state attorney 
felt that, 
there are some situations in which clients wouldn't be as frank if the privilege 
wasn't there .... One of the problems we have is getting our clients to come to 
us before they take action, because so many times folks think all lawyers do is 
say no. I think that they will be even more reluctant if it's not confidential. And 
I think we would be less effective at serving them. 151 
Nonetheless, the same attorney readily acknowledged that his clients "don't have 
absolute assurance, because you can't tell what a court is going to do," 152 
suggesting that to the extent clients do need the privilege to feel comfortable 
disclosing information, the privilege still may not need to be absolute. Another 
attorney explained that "for a number of matters that are sensitive or deal with 
issues of great importance, people want to know that the communications are 
covered" by the privilege. 153 Aside from these two remarks, attorneys did not 
148. Telephone Interview with SA#16 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
149. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
150. Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9, 2005). 
151. Telephone Interview with SA#3 (Nov. 29, 2005). 
152. /d. (emphasis added). 
153. Telephone Interview with SA #9 (Dec. 7, 2005).ln contrast to most other interviewees, this attorney had 
been in public practice for less than a year and had previously practiced in the private sector for fourteen years. 
She was generally more cautious in her responses than were most other interviewees. 
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emphasize the necessity of the privilege. 
Some attorneys also admitted difficulty in persuading their clients to disclose 
information to them, but attributed this to factors unrelated to uncertainty 
regarding the privilege. One attorney, who had worked in a state attorney 
general's office for more than twenty years, remarked that "you find that 
employees aren't forthcoming if they're not doing the right thing, regardless of 
whether there's a privilege."154 Another attorney, who also had worked in the 
public sector for about twenty years, explained that resistance to disclosure 
"sometimes comes up with disgruntled employees. Like maybe they're unhappy 
with the direction something is going, or with the agency head. So they're less 
willing to talk to the attorney, because they think why would I talk to you, you're 
the enemy too." 155 Neither of these impediments to candor would be remedied by 
an absolute privilege. 
At a recent ABA teleconference on Ethics for Government Attorneys, panelist 
Patricia Salkin argued strongly in favor of a government attorney-client privilege. 
However, she also remarked, 
It's common for all different kinds of staff to come in and spill their guts about 
vouchers not filled out correctly, about all kinds of potential ethics issues going 
on with other people in the office and they think that they can go and tell the 
lawyer to clear their conscience and walk out and feel good about it .... 156 
Salkin's comment exemplifies an underlying contradiction in the reasoning of 
many commentators: if the point of the privilege is to facilitate candor, yet 
government employees tend to reveal information even without the privilege, 
then what purpose does the privilege serve? The point of the privilege is not 
simply to conceal information for the convenience of the government attorney 
and her client-if the privilege is to exist, there must be some other policy 
rationale for its existence. 
In sum, the interviews with government attorneys provide at most limited 
support for the instrumental justification for the attorney-client privilege. 157 
Some clients do express concern about the privilege, but for the most part, 
attorneys indicated that their clients seem to think about the privilege infre-
quently, if at all. Moreover, the interviews also suggested that for many clients, 
154. Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
155. Telephone Interview with SA# 15 (Dec. 19, 2005). An absolute privilege would not make a difference 
in this situation because the individual employee would not have control over the assertion of the privilege. 
156. Audio CD: Everyday Ethics for Government Attorneys, held by the Am. B. Ass'n Center for Continuing 
Legal Educ. (Dec. 16, 2005) (on file with author). 
157. It is worth pointing out that the interviews cited in this section have captured lawyers' perceptions of 
their clients' disclosure incentives, while the clients themselves might tell a somewhat different story. 
Nonetheless, lawyers' opinions on whether their clients are forthcoming still provide valuable information. If an 
attorney believes that her client is generally candid, it suggests that, although the client may not always disclose 
every last detail, the level of disclosure is sufficient to satisfy the attorney's expectations and does not cause 
discernable interference with the representation. 
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the existence of the privilege is not determinative of their decision to disclose. 
Although the knowledge that a communication is privileged may put clients' 
minds at ease, they also seem not to know exactly what the privilege means, or 
even to need to know exactly what it means, in order to disclose information. 
Not surprisingly, attorneys tend to think about the privilege much more than 
their clients do. As one attorney said, "I do think that agency folks don't think in 
advance about the privilege. I think attorneys think about it more." 158 However, 
attorneys' concerns surrounding the privilege seemed to consist mainly of fear 
that an employee would accidentally waive the privilege, thereby revealing 
something that would be disadvantageous in litigation. They were less concerned 
that the uncertain legal status of the privilege would prevent their clients from 
communicating candidly. Indeed, most attorneys' efforts with respect to the 
privilege focused on making sure their clients did not inadvertently reveal 
privileged information. 159 
Perhaps the most accurate conclusion to draw is simply that the importance of 
the privilege in facilitating disclosure varies from one employee, agency, or state 
to the next. Even this conclusion demonstrates that the instrumental rationale is 
less powerful than many commentators have argued. If many clients disclose all 
relevant information without regard to whether their conversations are privi-
leged, then for these clients the privilege is superfluous. It prompts no increase in 
candor, yet shields communications from exposure, thus resulting in a net 
decrease in the amount of information available to the public relative to a world 
without the privilege. 160 The exact degree to which the attorney-client privilege 
does operate to increase candor among government employees is difficult to 
ascertain empirically, but in many cases the increase appears minimal. 
2. QUALITY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
The apparent candor of government employees despite the uncertainty of the 
158. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
159. For example, one attorney described her efforts as a "continuing education program between us and the 
agency." She explained, 
Every once in a while I have to send out a reminder saying, 'please remember to mark this privileged 
if it's from me.' Another thing is with email, sometimes people will send me a message and cc, like, 
seven or eight people. Now, I don't like that-I will reply just to the sender, and remind them that it's 
confidential. 
Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9, 2005). Another attorney explained, "What we try to train our clients 
to do is be careful with cc lists, and if they send emails on or forward them, that they have done thoughtful 
consideration of who they're sending it do." Telephone Interview with SA #15 (Dec. 19, 2005). A municipal 
attorney remarked, "I have to remind people on staff what it [the privilege] is and who it belongs 
to ... [S]omeone will want to tell me something, and I have to tell them that I may need to share that with the 
city manager and the city council." Telephone Interview with Municipal Attorney ("MA") #2 (Dec. 15, 2005). 
160. This contravenes Wigmore's theory of the policy underlying the privilege. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra 
note 65, § 2291. 
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privilege calls the instrumental necessity of the privilege into question. Still, we 
must also consider the ability of government attorneys to provide effective 
representation in the face of such uncertainty. It would be undesirable if an 
insufficient privilege interferes with government attorneys' ability to advise their 
clients or unduly disadvantages the government relative to private parties. 
In interviews, government attorneys generally affirmed that they were able to 
advise their clients effectively despite the uncertainty of the privilege. Some 
reported that they occasionally modified their behavior to avoid creating a 
situation where sensitive information would be subject to disclosure, but they did 
not report negative consequences from such modification. A thirty-year veteran 
of the attorney general's office in a state with expansive public disclosure laws 
explained that because everything would become public following the conclusion 
of litigation, "if we have something that's particularly sensitive, we don't put it in 
writing. Like with witness preparation-we don't say, 'we don't want you to say 
this' in writing." 161 Another attorney explained that if she goes to a meeting 
where she has not met everyone present, the first thing she does is find out who 
everyone is before she begins to talk, and "if there are people there who are not 
within the privilege, then I don't have a privileged conversation. I may say, 'I 
may need to have a talk with the director later, but here's what I can tell you 
today. "'162 
Commentators have questioned whether this sort of behavior modification, 
designed to work around a weak area in the government attorney-client privilege, 
might prevent attorneys from advising their clients as effectively. 163 One can 
certainly envision scenarios in which giving oral rather than written advice, or 
delaying advice to a client, might interfere with effective representation. 
However, government attorneys described such behavior modification matter-of-
factly rather than negatively, implying that these adaptations to their working 
environment did not actually have a negative impact on their performance. It 
seemed that the uncertainty of the privilege sometimes made the attorney's job 
more difficult, but attorneys felt that in general this difficulty did not result in less 
effective representation for the government client. 
Moreover, awareness that information could be revealed sometimes even 
produced desirable behavior modification. An attorney from a state that 
essentially treated the privilege as nonexistent except in litigation explained, 
"Sometimes when private attorneys come in they're startled that we don't have 
the privilege. But if it gives us an incentive to provide unfailingly good advice, 
then I think that's okay .... It's like a check that keeps you doing good work, the 
161. Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 
2005) ("We try not to put things in memos-we know it will come back to bite us."). 
162. Telephone Interview with SA#l5 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
163. See, e.g., Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1320-21. 
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knowledge that something could be discoverable. 164 Another attorney could not 
recall a time when the privilege had been asserted in his division outside of 
litigation. Nevertheless, he said, 
In thirty-five years, I never felt constricted in terms of what we wrote. Now 
when I carne here, they said to me, if you're prepared to put it on paper, you 
better be prepared to announce it from the street comer. But we give the best 
advice we can here. 165 
These attorneys' comments suggest that, in some cases, the knowledge that 
communications might become public helps to ensure that government attorneys 
provide high-quality legal advice. 
The other major concern relating to the quality of legal representation is that 
without a robust government attorney-client privilege, the government will face a 
disadvantage in proceedings against private parties. Government attorneys 
readily acknowledged that limitations on the privilege presented additional 
difficulties, particularly in situations where there were competing interests at 
stake. One municipal attorney characterized government representation as "much 
more difficult than having private clients" and explained that sometimes city 
council members would leak information to acquaintances. 166 Several attorneys 
also remarked that certain information was more freely available to the other side 
due to state FOIA laws that narrowed the attorney-client privilege. A state 
attorney explained, "If you think the other side hasn't produced everything, the 
tools to compel them are more limited for us."167 
Although attorneys were forthright about these exigencies, they also felt that 
some additional difficulty was inherent in government practice. No attorney 
could recall a situation when constraints on the privilege had resulted in 
significant disadvantage to the government. Interestingly, some attorneys indi-
cated that, although their litigation opponents in the private sector had far more 
access to potentially relevant information, this apparent liability often failed to 
materialize in practice because their opponents failed to avail themselves of the 
164. Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005). He also commented that "I haven't heard any 
experienced attorney here complain. I've heard nothing, zippo. I think everybody is comfortable with it." 
165. Telephone Interview with SA# II (Dec. 13, 2005). 
166. This municipal attorney recalled, 
When I was working as an attorney for another community ... we got authorization for a range of 
settlements in a personal injury case. But then someone leaked it to the plaintiffs. So when we went to 
negotiate, they knew the high end, and that was where they were starting from. It ended up costing us, 
like, $150,000. So ... it's a little like litigating with one hand tied behind your back. 
Telephone Interview with MA #I (Dec. 1, 2005). Such clearly problematic scenarios might be somewhat more 
likely in the municipality context, where a single attorney often represents a city council entity comprising 
several elected individuals with divergent interests. 
167. Telephone Interview with SA#lO (Dec. 9, 2005). 
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broad disclosure provisions affecting government parties. 168 
Moreover, even if the government might be slightly disadvantaged relative to 
private parties in some circumstances, many attorneys stressed that this was 
simply a cost of the openness critical to quality public sector legal representation. 
Public scrutiny, they felt, was an integral component of their role. A thirty-five 
year veteran of a state attorney general's office stated firmly, "When dealing with 
public agencies you want as much disclosure as possible."169 Another expressed 
agreement with a state decision abrogating the privilege in a criminal matter, 
explaining, "This is a public agency, and there were public funds involved. It's 
really a question of the public interest, and you don't want the attorney-client 
privilege to get in the way of that."170 Even an attorney who analogized 
representation of a municipality to "litigating with one hand tied behind your 
back" readily agreed that "one has to balance the fact that this is an annoyance in 
doing our jobs with the needs of the public for information and this principle of 
open government." 171 Thus, according to some government attorneys, a claim 
that abrogating the privilege impairs the quality of legal representation overlooks 
the contravening benefit of transparency in government. 
On the whole, attorneys seemed more concerned about the privilege once 
litigation was ongoing or imminent. Even attorneys who were generally content 
with a very minimal attorney-client privilege often attached greater importance to 
confidentiality once they were actually in litigation, noting the importance of 
other protections such as the work product privilege. 172 Provided that there was 
adequate protection for conversations undertaken in anticipation of litigation, 
attorneys were much less concerned about the abrogation of the privilege. The 
priority that attorneys place on shielding litigation preparation from scrutiny is 
unsurprising, and given our adversariallegal system, it seems desirable for such 
preparation to remain privileged. Thus, the eventual tailoring of the privilege 
should provide greater protection for such communication. 
C. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 
Discussions with government attorneys suggest that the traditional instrumen-
tal rationale cannot justify an absolute attorney-client privilege in all circum-
stances. In lieu of this traditional understanding, we should look to the wide 
variety of authorities that have conveyed a public-spirited vision of the 
government attorney's role to guide us in tailoring the privilege appropriately. 
168. For example, one attorney remarked, "It's all open, so opposing counsel could ask to see the entire file, 
they could ask to see attorney work product from a different case that is similar. But it doesn't happen." 
Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005). 
169. Telephone Interview with SA #11 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
170. Telephone Interview with SA# 12 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
171. Telephone Interview with MA#1 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
172. Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005). 
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This brief subsection cannot fully explore the nuances of the government 
attorney's role, nor will it attempt to delineate the proper scope of the privilege. 
Instead, I hope to highlight these issues as important areas for further research. 
Various legal authorities have hinted that the government attorney has a special 
set of responsibilities. In Berger v. United States, the Supreme Court explained: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done. 173 
While Berger specifically addressed the duties of prosecutors, many lower court 
decisions have echoed its sentiments when discussing government attorneys 
more generally174-as have a number of respected legal commentators. 175 The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct also support the idea that government 
attorneys have a unique responsibility to act for the public good. The comment to 
Model Rule 1.13 explains, "a government lawyer may have authority under 
applicable law to question [government officials'] conduct more extensively" 
than would a lawyer for a private organization. 176 As a result, "a different balance 
may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the 
wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved."177 In some 
situations, government attorneys even represent the general public in a more 
literal sense: for example, in the system of referendums and initiatives employed 
by twenty-four states, government attorneys have primary responsibility for 
defending enacted measures against legal challenge. 178 
This public-spirited conception of the government attorney's role is mirrored 
173. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
174. See, e.g., Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("As officers of this court, 
counsel have an obligation to ensure that the tribunal is aware of significant events that may bear directly on the 
outcome of litigation .... This is especially true for government attorneys, who have special responsibilities to 
both this court and the public at large."). 
175. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government 
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789 (2000) ("It is an uncontroversial proposition in 
mainstream American legal thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the 
common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private practice .... "); Douglas Letter, 
Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask is fora Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
1295, 1297 (1993) ("In theory, federal public servants have a single master: the people of the United States."); 
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, A Proposed Right of Conscience for Government Attorneys, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 
313-14 (2003) (explaining the government attorney's special responsibilities); Elisa Ugarte, The Government 
Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 269, 274 (1999) (citing the government lawyer's "obligation 
as a public servant"); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. 
L. REv. 1170, 1192 (2002) (citing a "strong moral intuition that government attorneys should bear some 
responsibility for considering public values"). 
176. MODEL RULES R. 1.13 cmt. 9. 
177. MODEL RULES R. 1.13 crnt. 9. 
178. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #7. 
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by the attitudes of government attorneys themselves. In the interviews I 
conducted, attorneys almost universally agreed that their role was different from 
that of private attorneys because a concern for the public interest informed all of 
their decisions. 179 Their awareness of this public responsibility sometimes caused 
them to alter their behavior in a variety of ways to further what they viewed as the 
public good. One attorney explained, 
We will be far less aggressive in objecting at a hearing when a public employee 
is being questioned. The idea is that this is a public employee and he should 
have to explain himself. Even if opposing counsel is asking fifty questions, and 
some of it is moving a little bit into something that is probably privileged, we 
will let it continue. 180 
Similarly, some attorneys explained that in certain situations they voluntarily 
disclose information that might be privileged. A state attorney recalled a situation 
involving the regulation of charities, for which the attorney general's office is 
solely responsible: "We went ahead and opened up all the files on the matter, and 
decided not to assert the privilege, although we could have .... But if it's more 
appropriate and more fair to the people of the state, then in our office, we can 
make that determination." 181 An attorney who had worked in government for 
twenty-two years spoke for many of his colleagues when he commented, "Our 
mantra is that what we do is for the benefit of the people ... Unlike private 
attorneys, we don't zealously represent clients."182 
All this evidence suggests that government attorneys do not have the unilateral 
responsibility to their clients that private attorneys do. Although government 
attorneys do advocate forcefully for the positions of the government officers and 
179. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005) ("Our mantra is that what we do is for the 
benefit of the people."); Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005) ("I think that while my responsibility 
is to the agency, I also have a responsibility to the [attorney general's] office which defends the entire state. So I 
have a broader client."); Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005) ("We've got to play fair all the time. 
Even when our clients want us to have four rows of teeth, we have to remember that we represent the state. We 
can't play hardball even when we want to."); Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("You are 
providing a vigorous defense, but you also have to look at the public good. And part of that is looking at the 
whole public picture."); Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005) ("[Representing the government] is 
really quite different, because in representing the agencies, you also represent the state of [redacted]. You have 
to think about what is good for the state, and good for the way government works .... There is this sense of 
public service."). Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005) ("Other times it's more where you act as an 
advisor to the agency, like you say, have you considered the impact on the taxpayers, or on the public fisc. The 
agency may say, we just want this issue to go away, and I'll say, this is going to make a bad precedent, or to be a 
bad thing for the other agencies, or something."). Nearly every government attorney discussed the idea of 
serving the public interest without prompting. 
180. Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005). 
181. Telephone Interview with SA #17 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
182. Telephone Interview with SA #1 (Nov. 22, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #15 (Dec. 15, 
2005) ("I think it's very suspicious when an agency does something to hide something that would otherwise be 
public. There's this question of the public interest, and basic principles of democracy. If there's no public policy 
reason to invoke the privilege, why would you?"). 
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agencies that they represent, their responsibility to the general public is always in 
the background and at times affects the manner in which they represent their 
clients. 
Courts have suggested that these broad concerns of public interest and justice 
come to bear in delineating the extent of a privilege. For example, in United 
States v. Arthur Young & Company, the court declined to create a privilege for an 
accountant's work product on the grounds that an independent auditor such as a 
public accountant "assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment 
relationship with the client."183 The Court explained that the public accountant 
"owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders as well 
as to the investing public. This 'public watchdog' function demands that the 
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires 
complete fidelity to the public trust." 184 There are important differences between 
an accountant and an attorney for the government. Still, the Court's emphasis on 
the accountant's public responsibilities demonstrates that the public interest is an 
important concern in determining the extent of a privilege. 
Ultimately, this Note does not attempt to formulate the exact circumstances 
under which the attorney-client privilege protects communications between 
government officers and their attorneys. However, conversations with practicing 
government attorneys indicate that the instrumental justification carries far less 
weight than it has traditionally been assigned. Consequently, we must look 
elsewhere for guidance in sculpting the contours of the government attorney-
client privilege. An array of authority suggests that the paramount responsibility 
of the government attorney is to work for the public interest, and it is with the 
public-spirited values of governmental transparency and openness in mind that 
courts should attempt to craft a suitable tailoring of the privilege. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The most commonly cited rationale for the attorney-client privilege is 
instrumental: the privilege is necessary to facilitate candid communication 
between clients and attorneys. However, in the government entity context, this 
justification falls short. The protection afforded by the privilege is already 
uncertain, due to various open government provisions and political and media 
pressures, yet government employees continue to communicate with sufficient 
candor to allow government attorneys to provide effective representation. 
Thus, a more limited version of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate for 
the public sector, and my hope is that future research will elaborate on the shape 
the privilege should take. Courts, commentators, ethical canons, and attorneys 
themselves have noted the unique responsibility of the government attorney to 
183. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)(emphasis in original). 
184. /d. at 818. 
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serve not only the government entity she represents, but also the public interest. 
Ultimately, defining the privilege with this obligation in mind will best facilitate 
the important democratic values of transparency and openness in government. 
